# Framework issues: Independence and effectiveness in utility regulation

Organisation of Caribbean
Utility Regulators
September 2004

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### Overview

- Overview of United States "cooperative federalist" approach
- Effective regulation baseline
- Forces encouraging regulatory change
- Joint service regulation as a form of cooperation
- ROC" An example of regional (state-to-state) cooperation on opening local telecoms market to competition

## I. U.S. "cooperative federalist" telecoms policy

### A Simplified U.S. story

- The early 1990s.
- The last major rewrite of national law was 60 years ago, and the biggest companies in the industry have been under the supervision of a judge for 10 years.
- Bell Operating Companies subject to anti-trust order, cannot provide in region long-distance without a court waiver, don't want large competitive entry into local, would like reduced retail regulation.
- AT&T and MCI interested in quick and low cost access to local market, and slowing BOC entry into long distance.
- Facilities-based "CLECs" want interconnection and good performance and prices from the incumbent.

### A Simplified U.S. story

- Rural telecom providers concerned about universal service.
- Policy experts, academics, interested in various kinds of reform.
- Consumer advocates want low prices for residential service, affordable service for low income citizens, and service quality protection.
- States want to preserve their historically strong role in telecoms policy.
- Other interests include broadcasters, cable companies, wireless providers, print publishers, tech and equipment companies, schools and libraries and rural health care advocates, local governments.



### 1996 US Telecommunications Act goals


"To provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition, and for other purposes."

Conference Report

- Open markets
- Support introduction of advanced services
- Maintain universal service and let's not forget -
- Consumer protection

## Telecom Act of 1996 - State commission duties

- Interconnection Sections 251-2
  - Prices
  - Terms
  - Facilities
  - Enforcement Sec. 271
- Advanced services Sec. 706
- Promoting competition, local and long distance 271-2
- Maintaining and advancing universal service Sec. 254
  - Antithesis of competition, or basis for some competition?
  - ED/CD opportunities and approaches
- Prohibiting barriers to competitive entry Sec. 253
- Protecting customers of monopoly and competitive services Sec 253
  - Traditional methods still useful
  - New methods required



#### Market Structure Effects (telecom)

- Prohibits local exchange monopolies
- Prohibits franchising authorities from restricting cable company provision of telecommunications services
- Differentiates Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) from Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs)
- Special rules for Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs)
- Special rules for rural LECs
- Creates "information services" category, distinct from telecommunications service

## Federalism - US states as vehicles of national policy in 1996 Telecoms Act

- Old "dual federalism"
  - Section 2(b) reservation of intrastate rate and service authority
  - Jurisdictional separations
- New "cooperative federalism"
  - 253 preemption of state/local barriers to entry
    - (d)(3) allows consistent state/local policies
  - 2(b) retained
  - States revise statutes to grant authority consistent with Telecom Act
- Not "preemptive federalism"
  - National government assumes entire policy and implementation responsibility
- Note USTA v. FCC (DC Circuit) prohibiting certain "subdelegations" from FCC to state commissions



## US federalism and European "subsidiarity" compared

Deciding the appropriate level for action - EC or member nation.

- Generally, as close to the citizen as possible
- Maastricht Treaty in areas not within the EU's exclusive competence, will act only if objectives cannot be achieved by Member States, and due to scale or effect of the proposed action, can better be achieved by the Community
- Amsterdam Treaty Community action should not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives ("proportionality principle")

Old word: Dual federalism. "One big company," two regulators, and a "horse high fence."

New world: Broken fences, lots of "borders" – technology, layers, jurisdictions, etc., but nobody can find the property lines. Many issues happen on the borders.

Alternative 1: Preemptive federalism. Efficiency, consistency, scope of markets require national action. ("Withering away of the states." Strongly top down.

Alternative 2: Subsidiarity. "Bottoms up." EU/Articles of confederation.

Alternative 3: Cooperative federalism. Both federal and state authorities charged with implementing federal law within a federal structure. Less top down.





### Baseline requirements

- Sufficient independence from government and regulated sectors
  - "Bounded independence"
- Sufficient resources
  - Legal and political authority
  - Staff and commissioner training
  - Other resources
- Sound processes
  - Predictable
  - Efficient
- Stakeholder and public understanding
- Transparent decisions
- Outcomes
  - Investment and deployment
  - Rates
  - Service quality
  - Service choices
  - Efficiency
  - Equity
  - Procedural outcomes perceived fairness and effectiveness

### Elements of effective regulation


- Transparency of process and reasons for decision
  - Does multi-member board help?
- Neutrality between parties
- Professionalism
  - Understand technology and economics
- Independence from utility management
- Independence from rest of government
  - Employment processes
  - Budgeting
- Judicial review
- Understanding of informed public and decision leaders
- Can various forms of cooperation help strengthen these elements?



- Limited legal authority
  - Mismatch with markets
  - Access to information
  - Ability to structure remedies
- Limited resources
  - Budgetary
  - Personnel
  - Investigative
  - Technical and economic analysis
- Limited political legitimacy
- Can various forms of cooperation help address these barriers?







#### Continuous change in each industry sector.

Continuous change in policy.

Continuous change in regulatory structure.

Continuous change in demands on and opportunities for agency staff.

## How do we know when it's time to change?

How do we initiate change?

How do we implement change?

How do we respond to change?

### Asymmetries and borders

- Nation to nation treaties, settlements.
- Federation to member state subsidiarity, federalism.
- State to state regional coordination, consultation, shared proceedings, regional authorities (electric RTOs).
- Nation or state to firm law, regulation, or "ether" (implicit consensus)
- Firm to firm business practices, standards, law, regulation.
- Firm to customer consumer protection, privacy.
- Can various forms of cooperation help address these barriers?



### Asymmetries and borders

- Networks, firms and and markets cross international and other boundaries
- Providers offer multiple products, some are substitutable, either now or over time
- How to coordinate policy across jurisdictions, across markets, across products?
- How to share resources, including information and skills?
- Growing interest in regional coordination on regulatory issues

## Forces driving change in utility policy/economic regulation.

- Technology more scalable, flexible, and powerful.
  - Affects regulated sectors.
  - Affects regulatory decision-making tools.

#### Economics

- Greater interest in market models.
  - Now "sadder but wiser"?
- Increasing mismatches between scope of regulatory authority and scope of firm or market.

#### Law –

- Challenges to formalism.
- New decision making models.

### Forces driving change, cont.

#### Politics

- Legislative and interest group pressure.
- Federalism national policy directions affecting state policy.
- Internal staff and commissioner frustration and turnover, resource constraints.
- "Regulatory bypass"
  - Declining consent of the regulated.
  - Declining consent of some (mainly large) consumers.



## Changing regulatory roles – regulatory restructuring

- Retargeting policy resources
  - Less direct retail rate regulation.
  - More wholesale terms and enforcement.
  - Universal service.
  - Technology and ED/CD
  - Consumer protection.
  - Quality of service concerns recurring but what approaches will work?
  - Cooperation as a strategy to understand, respond to, and help guide change.



### regulatory regime includes consideration of

The substance of regulation,

the **form** of regulation,

and the **forum** in which regulation occurs.

### "The pyramid of policy"

#### **Retail Rates**

\*Rate base/Rate of Return

\*AFØRs \*Price cap

#### •<u>Level</u>

- •Federal
- •Regional
- •State
- •Local

#### Form

- Contested case
- **Tariff**
- •Rulemaking
- •ADR
- •Contract
- •Implicit consensus

#### **Customer**

Customer education

Consumer protection

Retail service quality

#### **Universal Service**

Customer support – Low Income Loop support – High Cost Fund

E911 \* Schools & libraries \* Rural health care

#### Forum

- •Legislature
- Agency
- •Court
- •Standards body
- •Private dispute resolution

#### Wholesale

\*Rates \*Terms \*Numbering


\*Interconnection/unbundling \*Structural/non-structural safeguards

General consumer law\*Uniform Commercial Code\*General contract law\*

\*Anti-trust \*Common law


"State of nature" - Hobbes vs. Rousseau

#### How does the public role change?





### Required functions in the new environment



Source: Wirick



### Dynamic regulators' characteristics

Outwardly focused

Constantly learning

Outcome oriented

Ecological

Multidimensional Informationbased

Vision driven

Collaborative

Source: Wirick

### Reform in a bounded world

- What are the primary goals in telecom reform?
- What are the tools through which it can be achieved?
- Who are the stakeholders and what are their interests?
  - Stakeholders currently have a set of "rights" that reform would modify or reallocate
- What other constraints are there on an "ideal" outcome?
- In this bounded world, what set of strategies are best employed to achieve the public interest?
  - Is there a "public interest"? How do we know it?

By standing behind the "veil of ignorance" about our own position, we can better determine what is in the public interest, rather than in our own narrower interest.



If you didn't know what was in your own interest, what would you consider in the public interest?

### Paraphrasing John Rawls, <u>A Theory of Justice</u>



## Decision tree for designing a new structure

- What values underlie the work?
- What needs to be done (objectives)?
- How should it be done, most consistently with the underlying values?
- Who should do what needs to be done?
- <u>Feedback</u> How will we know when we do not need to do something anymore, do less of it, or do it differently?

## IV. Joint service regulatory bodies

A form of cooperation across sectors



### Joint service regulatory bodies

- Might combine some or all of telecoms (wireline, wireless, broadcast, cable), electric, natural gas, water, even transportation
- Economies of scale and scope
  - Eliminates duplication
  - Same skills e.g., legal, accounting, economics, consumer protection.




### Joint service regulatory bodies

- Dynamic efficiencies learning from experience in another industry
- Recognize common evolution toward competition
- Recognizes convergence among industries



## Evolution of joint services regulation - external

- Merging bodies
  - Potential and perceived challenges:
    - May be conflicting statutory roles or
    - May conflict with organizational cultures
    - May affect external support and acceptance, or alter balance between regulator and regulated
    - May withdraw resources or focus from one set of tasks
- Adding new functions to existing bodies
  - Challenges: Above, or may lack appropriate tools for new function



## Evolution of joint services regulation - external

- Creating new bodies
  - Challenges:
    - May lose experience or legal precedent.
    - May be disruptive.
    - Change may be less than meets the eye ("old whine in new bottles")



## Evolution of joint services regulation - internal by sector

- Combine functions in one entity, but retain separate offices for each sector, e.g., telecoms and electricity
  - Common agency head, different staff
  - Allows specialization
  - Reduces efficiencies
  - Reduces shared learning



## Evolution of joint services regulation - internal by function

- Recognizes industry convergence, common trajectory toward competition
- Organize by:
  - Economics market analysis, competition policy
  - Consumer protection and education
  - Universal service/access
  - Accounting and auditing
  - Engineering systems issues
  - Complaints and enforcement
- May/Should change as markets, technology, policy



- Telecom
  - Spectrum
  - International transport facilities and terms
  - Coordinating with multi-country firms
  - New services and VOIP
  - Reliability
  - Promoting buildout and access



- Energy
  - Supply adequacy
  - Infrastructure, including audits
  - Reliability
  - Buildout and access



- General
  - ADR
  - Consumer participation
  - Harmonization
  - "Best practices approaches"



- The issue of ADR and consumer protection needs to be explored more
- Issue of regulatory enforcement
- Law reform ideas for improvement
- Comprehensive database of case laws and legislations of various nations
- Need comprehensive database so can benchmark
- Performance indicators
- Regulation for the future VOIP, changes in technologies?

