# Cross-Subsidies That Minimize Electricity Consumption Distortions

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#### The Problem

- Traditionally, electricity rates have been set on a per kWh basis, and ideally based upon average costs.
- Given the structure of electricity production, most of the costs are fixed in generation, transmission, and distribution facilities.
- Consequently, multi-part pricing makes sense and can be efficient when compared to per kWh charges.
  - Charges=monthly fixed charge + per kWh charge based on variable costs



#### The Problem

- It is also the case that many countries wish to subsidize certain groups to advance social goals such as equity universal access.
- Given that governments are budget constrained, this means cross-subsidies must be used to achieve these social objectives.
- Without cross-subsidies, on a per kWh basis, the cost of service to smaller residential customers is usually more than larger commercial and industrial customers.




#### Idea

- Implement efficient multi-part pricing as a baseline, and cross-subsidize small, poorer customers through fixed charges which are non-distortionary.
- The per kWh charge would be based on the marginal cost of producing power.
- The fixed charge would have a link to the fixed cost of service to each customer type.




# Average Cost Pricing vs. Multi-part Pricing

- Average cost pricing leads to a loss in welfare of 3+5.
- Multi-part pricing captures that lost welfare for consumers. Utility gets area 2+4.






#### **Residential Customers**





#### **Industrial Customers**





### The Cross-Subsidy

#### Table 1

	Multi-Part Prices, No Cross Subsidy				Multi-Part Prices, Cross Subsidy			
	Mulu-Part Flices, NO Cross Subsidy				Iviuiu-i ait i	Mulu-Part Prices, Closs Subsidy		
Customer	Price and	Consumer	Fixed		Price and	Consumer	Fixed	
Class	Quantity	Surplus	Charge		Quantity	Surplus	Charge	
Residential	$P^{MC}, Q^{MC}$	1+3+5	2+4		$P^{MC}$ , $Q^{MC}$	1+3+5+(3	2+4-(3	
						and 5 from	and 5	
		\ \		4		Industrial)	from	
							industrial)	
Industrial	$P^{MC}, Q^{MC}$	1+3+5	2+4		$P^{MC}$ , $Q^{MC}$	1	2+3+4+5	


#### Table 2

	Average Cost Pricing			Multi-Part Prices, Cross Subsidy			
Customer	Price and	Consumer	Producer	Price and	Consumer	Fixed	
Class	Quantity	Surplus	Surplus	Quantity	Surplus	Charge	
Residential	$P^{AC}$ , $Q^{AC}$	1	2+4	$P^{MC}$ , $Q^{MC}$	1+3+5+(3	2+4-(3	
			(3+5 is the		and 5 from	and 5	
			deadweight		Industrial)	from	
			loss)			industrial)	
Industrial	$P^{AC}$ , $Q^{AC}$	1	2+4	$P^{MC}$ , $Q^{MC}$	1	2+3+4+5	
			(3+5 is the				
			deadweight				
			loss)				



#### **Other Potential Funds**

The rents from charging marginal cost can also be used to implement the cross-subsidy.





## **Implementation Considerations**

- Estimates of Demand
  - Without good estimates of demand by customer class, it will be difficult to implement the scheme.
- Cost of Service Studies
  - The cost of service study will provide the baseline cost reflective rates by which the cross-subsidy is implemented.
- Regulatory Mechanism
  - A mechanism that will fix revenue, based on fixed costs would be most appropriate...a revenue cap.
- Uneconomic Bypass
  - This could still be a problem is the cross-subsidy goes too far, but as proposed here this should not be a problem.



## **Implementation Considerations**

- Customer Base Configurations
  - It is assumed that large customers have more wealth, though this may not always be the case.
  - Moreover, some smaller customers may be quite wealthy and perhaps could receive a subsidy even though they may not need it.
- Industry Configuration
  - This can be applied to a vertically integrated monopoly or to an unbundled competitive environment as long as fixed and variable costs are separated out.



### **Concluding Thoughts**

- The proposed cross-subsidy uses optimal multi-part pricing as its basis.
- The cross-subsidy is non-distortionary to consumption decisions.
- The cross-subsidy proposed does not leave any customer class worse off in terms of welfare compared to average cost pricing.
- Implementing this scheme may be quite difficult and time consuming and must be done with care.

